Freedom, but for All
How liberal freedom is only freedom for the rich
Freedom is classically considered the core tenet of liberalism, whereas socialism is taken to champion equality. That is, plainly, nonsense. Classic socialists, particularly Karl Marx, were mainly concerned with freedom in the sense of freeing the working class from exploitation and creating a society free from artificial economic constraints, in which everyone is free to develop their interests in different directions. Indeed, socialism, in that sense, has developed the most coherent idea of freedom to date.
Unfortunately, many people, including socialists, have forgotten about this classic socialist heritage. As a result, the following picture has emerged in our collective memory: Liberalism (e.g. Locke), particularly in its contemporary neoliberal guise (e.g. Hayek, Friedman), argues vehemently that freedom means "freedom from" interference—mainly government interference.
More reflective socialists or so-called "social liberals" (e.g. Sen, Miller)—who did not fall for the ideology capture that socialism is about social justice or equality—have argued against this liberal mantra, claiming that what really matters is "freedom to"—that real freedom means having the support and capabilities to act as one wills, rather than merely the absence of restrictions; a conceptual distinction strongly inspired by the work of Isaiah Berlin.
However, this distinction itself is artificial. As I will show, the difference between "freedom from" and "freedom to" is arbitrary. Both linguistic forms can be used to formulate coherent versions of the idea of freedom, which is, as I will show below, a severe blow to the philosophical and economic underpinnings of liberalism.
Historical Genealogy
Early liberalism emerged as a challenge to aristocratic and monarchical domination. Thinkers such as John Locke focused on freedom from state overreach, arguing for civil liberties, legal equality, and property rights. In societies where the primary form of oppression came from monarchs and landed elites, this framing made sense at the time: the most visible restriction on freedom was the aristocratic state that, while it had many positive historic functions, was essentially a society in which aristocrats and landed elites exploited most everyone else.
However, as power in society shifted to economic elites and it became clear what possibilities for personal realization were brought forth by the technical marvels of the Industrial Revolution, the new coercive power increasingly lay with capitalists. Against this form of coercion, socialism formed. Not only freedom from negative government action, but also freedom from capitalist organization became a priority.
If we are charitable, we can argue that liberals simply overlooked interference beyond the negatively acting state because many early liberal thinkers lived at a time when the main power in society was held by the state and these aristocrats were exploitative. However, that does not mean that freedom from interference should be restricted to the state, nor that it should be applied per se to the state—because, obviously, states can be in the hands of the people or in the hands of elites. States can play an indispensable enabling role, or they can play an exploitative, tyrannical role.
Artificial Separations
To return to my argument that "freedom to" collapses into "freedom from" and vice versa: Liberals like examples, such as: I am not free if I am not free from government regulations to start my own business. Socialists might reply that this might be the case, but that it is at least as valid to state things such as: Without public health insurance, I am not free to live a carefree life. Without public education, I am not free to develop the capabilities to succeed in life.
While true, the distinction is artificial. Liberals could likewise claim: I am not free if I am not able to start a business because of government regulations. And socialists could likewise state: Without public health insurance, I am not free from illness. Without public education, I am not free from ignorance.
The main difference here lies only in linguistic convention and arbitrary grammatical form. The pragmatic meaning is, in both cases, the same.
Arbitrary Reductions
Now that we have addressed the logical structure of the concept of freedom, it becomes clear that there is no relevant difference between "freedom from" and "freedom to." The only thing that matters from an ethical point of view is the actual constraints on people's ability to act.
From this, we can easily see that the neoliberal restriction of "freedom from" to government interference is arbitrary. There is no reason to believe that government action is per se problematic rather than beneficial, and it is moreover not clear why the concept of freedom should stop at government intervention.
We can drive this home with an example cherished by liberals: the starting of a business venture. Say, I was born into a working-class family but have the ambition to start a car company. There are various things that keep me from doing that. So to speak, I am not free to start my own car business because I am not free from the domination of bigger corporations that benefit from economies of scale, in-house savings, a more developed supply chain, capital, a marketing department, first-mover advantages, and so on.
Moreover, liberals seem to focus on the idea that the meaning of life is seemingly starting a business venture. Yet, most people care little for that. They would like to be artists, writers, activists, scientists, or something else. However, they are not free from economic constraints imposed on them by the false scarcity and inefficiency resulting from capitalist organization—indeed, Marx’s main issue in his philosophical manuscripts.
It is this lack of freedom from the structure of capitalist organization that determines the jobs in which we work, the businesses we can open, how much free time we have for ourselves, whether the occupation we have is meaningful or not, the income and wealth we can generate, and so forth.
Summary
I hope I have achieved two things in this article. First, I have shown that the difference between "freedom from" and "freedom to" is artificial. That means that socialist concerns voiced about "freedom to" can be housed in "freedom from" and, more importantly, "freedom from" can in general be used to formulate a broader and more consistent theory of freedom. Second, I have argued that the classic socialist idea of freedom is in that sense the more complete, more coherent concept of freedom, because it applies not only or per se to government interference but also to all other relevant forms of constraint.
It must be said that not all of this follows from collapsing the "freedom from/freedom to" dichotomy. My argument that liberals have no justified and motivated reason to restrict "freedom from" to government action can be assessed separately. Likewise, socialists should always have been able to formulate their concept of freedom within the confines of "freedom from," as becomes clear from my discussion of starting a business venture in the section above. Of course, in some sense, thinkers like Marx did exactly that and did not care for the linguistically arbitrary forms that became so prominent due to the infelicitous influence of analytic philosophy with its obsession with language, i.e., the paradigm in which many of the thoughts discussed above originated.
Finally, I want to add that socialists—and with that, I mean all socialists, including social democrats—should focus their message on freedom rather than social justice or equality. The latter terms are unattractive to many for various reasons; freedom seems rightfully attractive to most.
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© 2025 Alexander Jeuk for the text. For the image see the caption.